Interactive proof systems in which the Prover is restricted to have a polynomial size strategy are investigated. The restriction of polynomial size computation tree, or logarithmically bounded number of coin flips, guarantee a polynomial size strategy. One result is that interactive proof systems in which the Prover is restricted to a polynomial size strategy are equivalent to MA, Merlin-Arthur games, of Babai and Moran [l]. Polynomial tree size is also equivalent to MA, but when logarithmic space is added as a restriction, the power of polynomial tree size reduces to NP. A logarithmic number of coin flips is equivalent to NP, even when logarithmic space is added as a restriction.
Introduction
Interactive proof systems (IP) were introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff as a formal model to investigate issues in cryptography and as a natural extension to NP, the class of problems solvable in nondeterministic polynomial time [12] . The vision was that in an interactive proof system a Prover and a Verifier would interact in such way that the Prover could convince the Verifier with high probability of a true fact, but could only convince a Verifier with very low probability of a false fact. In this model, the Prover is all-powerful and the Verifier is limited to run in polynomial time. The Verifier has the additional ability to flip an unbiased coin.
The issue which we address in this paper is whether this original IP model can really serve as a practical basis for cryptography or as a practical extension of NP. Certainly, there are practical aspects of cryptography, but what do we mean by a practical extension of NP? How can we even say that NP is practical a.t all, given that it is still an open question whether or not there are polynomial algorithms for NP-complete problems? The class NP is a practical class in the sense that, given a language L E N P and a particular input x E L it is possible for a Prover to write down proof of membership of x in L which could be checked by a polynomial time bounded Verifier. Thus, for each 2 E L the Prover has a polynomial size strategy for convincing the Verifier of the fact that x E L.
In this case, the Prover's strategy consists of the polynomial length proof it would present to the Verifier. The practical aspect of NP is that the Prover is not all-powerful, but relies on a polynomial size strategy to convince the Verifier.
If one examines the early result of Goldreich, MiCali, and Wigderson that graph nonisomorphism is in IP [ll] one can intuitively see that the Prover, in proving that two graphs are not isomorphic, does not use a polynomial size strategy. More emphatically, the recent results of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [15] and Shamir's striking result that IP = PSPACE [17] , demonstrate that the all-powerful Prover is actually using a polynomial space computable strategy to convince the Verifier. There is no evidence that polynomial space computations are at all practical.
In this paper, we define restrictions which can be placed on both the Prover and the Verifier in order to make interactive proof systems potentially practical. Then, we prove a number of results about these restricted interactive proof systems. The principal restriction we consider is limiting the Prover to having a polynomial size strategy. The restriction to a polynomial size strategy is tantamount to saying that the interactive proof system could potentially be practically implemented. The formal definition of the polystrategy restriction is given in Section 2.
If the interaction between Prover and Verifier can be represented by a polynomial size computation tree, visible to the Prover, then the Prover has a very simple polynomial size strategy. Alternatively, if the Verifier is limited to a logarithmic number of flips of a coin, then again the Prover has a simple polynomial size strategy. Thus, we define restrictions on interactive proof systems called poly-tree-size and log-randombits, which are special cases of poly-strategy. If we restrict the Prover and Verifier to logarithmic space then the question arises as to whether a restricted Prover can convince such a limited Verifier of as much aa it could when they each had no such space limitation. It turns out that our most technically challenging results are about interactive proof systems where the Prover and Verifier limited to logarithmic space. We call this restriction log-space. Finally, interactive proof systems may be public or private, referring respectively to whether the Prover has full view of what the Verifier is doing or whether what the Verifier is doing can be partially hidden from the Prover. Although public and private interactive proof systems have been shown to be equivalent [13] , this equivalence does not necessarily carry over to our restricted interactive proof systems.
Motivating Example
To motivate our study of restricted systems, we use as an example the interactive proof set 3-CNF-SAT, which is the set of satisfiable Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form with at most three literals per clause. The traditional proof that 3-CNF-SAT is in NP shows that in polynomial time, a Prover can convince a Verifier that a formula is satisfiable, by simply listing the assignment of truth values to the variables. However, the Verifier needs linear space, in order to store this assignment. What if the Verifier has only O(1ogn) space? We show that in this case, the Prover can convince the Verifier with high probability that a formula is satisfiable, even if the Verifier has only O(1og n ) random bits.
Given a Boolean formula in 3 conjunctive normal form as input, the Prover sends information to the Verifier in two phases. In the first phase, the Prover sends an assignment of a truth value to each instance of a literal in the formula ordered by variable number. Thus, in the first phase all instances of a variable a.nd its complement are sent before instances of the next variable and its complement are sent. In the second phase, the Prover sends the assignment to each instance of a literal in the formula, in the order in which the literals appear in the formula.
It may help to give a concrete example to explain what the Prover does. Consider the formula:
We represent the assignment of a truth value to an instance of a literal as a triple ( l , i , v ) where 1 is the literal, i is the number of the clause it appears in, and v E {T, F } is the assigned value. In the first phase the Prover sends the sequence:
In the second phase the Prover sends the sequence:
These sequences are sent by the Prover and received by the Verifier one character at a time, assuming a standard encoding of the sequences into a finite alphabet.
The Verifier does three checks. First, during the first phase of the Prover's protocol the verifier can check if each instance of a literal is given the same value and whether the complement of a literal is given the complementary value. Second, during the second phase of the Prover's protocol, the Verifier checks that each clause of the formula is satisfied. These first two checks can be done by the Verifier deterministically using only O(1og n) space. What remains to be checked is whether or not the information sent in the first phase is consistent with the information sent in the second phase. This third check is done in O(1og n) space with O(1ogn) random bits, using a technique of Lipton 1141 called "fingerprinting of multisets", which we describe in Section 4. Roughly, the idea is to reduce the problem of checking consistency of information sent in the two phases to that of checking if two multisets are equal. A short random fingerprint of each multiset is computed by the Verifier for this purpose, so that the multisets need not be stored explicitly. As the Verifier fingerprints the first multiset it is very important that the Prover not see what the Verifier is doing. If the Prover could see the fingerprint of the first multiset then it could potentially send a different multiset with the same fingerprint, thereby fooling the Verifier into believing two distinct multisets were equal. Thus, this interactive proof system is private and not public. This interactive proof system is an example of one where Prover and Verifier are severely restricted, yet an NP-complete problem can still be proved and verified.
Related Work
Interactive proof systems with the log-space restriction have been studied in detail although not with the additional restrictions considered in this paper. (See for example [5] , [SI or [SI) . Condon [3] previously studied log-space, "one-way" interactive proof systems, in which the Verifier never writes on the communication cell. A one-way interactive proof system is a special case of a private interactive proof system with the poly-tree-size restriction.
Feige, Fiat and Shamir [7] introduced a notion of interactive proofs of knowledge, where the prover wishes to convince the verifier that it "knows some secret" S about an input x, that satisfies a polynomial time computable predicate P ( x , S ) . For example, if z is a Boolean formula, S might be an assignment to the variables of the formula and P ( z , 5') is true if and only if S is a satisfying assignment for z. In their model, like ours, the power of the prover is restricted; in fact the prover is a probabilistic, polynomial time bounded Turing machine which has S on a private tape. In this sense, their model is similar to our model of a prover with a polynomial-size strategy, where the strategy corresponds to the secret S. However, there are important differences between the two models, stemming from the fact that our model is a language acceptor, whereas the model of Feige, Fiat and Shamir is an interactive proof system of knowledge, not a language acceptor.
In a different context, Blum and Kannan [2] studied restricted interactive proof systems, where the communication of the Verifier and Prover is restricted in the following way. The Verifier sends strings x to the Prover and receives the response f(z), for some fixed function f. Although this limits the strategy of the Prover, it does not seem to be closely related to our restrictions of poly-strategy or poly-tree-size. We know of no previous work on interactive proof systems wit,h the restriction log-random-bits.
Our notion of polynomial tree size was inspired by the RUZZO'S notion of polynomial tree size for alternating Turing machines [lS]. The adaptation of polynomial tree size to interactive proof systems is new to the best of our knowledge.
New Results
In stating our results, we denote by IP(<restriction 1>, ..., <restriction k>) the class of languages accepted by interactive proof systems with <restriction 1>, ..., <restriction k>. Thus, our example above shows that 3-CNF-SAT is a member of the set IP(1og-space, log-random-bits). We assume that our interactive proof systems are private unless they are actually specified as public. Thus, in the example IP(1og-space, log-random-bits) we are referring to private interactive proof systems. If we want to indicate public interactive proof systems then we write IP(public, <restriction 1>, ..., <restriction k>). Our main results are as follows.
(1) We first characterize the class of languages accepted by interactive proof systems in which the Prover is restricted to having a polynomial size strategy, but there is no restriction on the space used by Prover or Verifier. It turns out that this class is exactly equivalent to the class of languages MA, defined by Babai and Moran [l] . The class MA stands for the languages recognized by so-called Merlin-Arthur games. Thus, we have the fundamental result:
IP(po1y-strategy) = MA.
It turns out that some additional restrictions do not remove any more power. Thus we prove: MA = IP(po1y-strategy) = IP(public, poly-strategy) = IP(po1y-tree-size).
On the other hand, we show that if we add more restrictions we reduce the power of interactive proof systems to NP. NP = IP(public, log-random-bits) = IP(public, poly-tree-size) = IP(1og-random-bits).
The techniques to prove these results are fairly straightforward, but revealing. These results are proved in Section 3.
(2) We next consider private, log-space interactive proof systems. We show that with either the polytree-size or log-random-bits restriction, such interactive proof systems accept the class NP. The principal results of Section 4 are: NP = IP(1og-space, poly-tree-size) = IP(1og-space, log-random-bits).
Several of the proofs are notable. Lipton's fingerprinting of multisets [14] is used help show NP C IP(1og-space, log-random-bits). The proof that IP(1og-space, poly-tree-size) C N P requires a new and interesting technique of constructing and evaluating a computation tree of an interactive proof system.
(3) Finally, we consider public, log-space interactive proof systems. Our results show that again, with either the restriction poly-tree-size or log-random-bits, such interactive proof systems are equivalent. However, they are apparently much weaker than the corresponding private interactive proof systems, since the class of languages they accept is contained in LOGCFL, the class of languages which are logarithmic space reducible to context-free languages [18] . The principal results of Section 5 are:
IP(public, log-space, poly-tree-size) = IP(public, log-space, log-random-bits), and NLOG C IP(public, log-space, poly-tree-size) LOGCFL.
Again several of the proofs are notable. The result that IP(public, log-space, poly-tree-size) IP(public, log-space, log-random-bits) uses a general tree pruning technique which allows a computation tree to be pruned back without sacrificing much in the acceptance probability. The result that IP(public, logspace, poly-tree-size) LOGCFL uses the equivalence of LOGCFL to the class of languages accepted by auxiliary pushdown automata which use O(1ogn) storage and polynomial time [18] . 
Definitions
Because we are interested in limiting the power of the Prover in an interactive proof system we adopt a definition which facilitates the analysis of a weakened Prover, but is equivalent to the standard definition [12] when the Prover is unrestricted. Our definition follows the definition of so-called "game automata" given by Condon and Ladner [4] .
An interactive proof system is a pair (P, V ) of communicating Turing machines, P for Prover and V for Verifier. P is a nondeterministic Turing machine and V is a.probabilistic Turing machine. Both P and V have access to a common input and V has access to a fair random coin. P and V also share a communication tape in order to communicate with each other.
A run of the interactive proof system begins with P computing, then V computing, then back to P , and so on alternating back and forth, until V halts and either accepts or rejects the input. During a run of (P, V), P has nondeterministic choices it can make. We can think of the particular choices it make as its execution of a strategy. Also, during a run, V has random choices it can make, but otherwise executes deterministically. Generally speaking, V is allowed to compute privately, that is, V has its own work tape which is not visible to P and the results of V's coin flips are also not visible to P. A configuration of (P, V) is the standard object which describes all the components of the interactive proof system at a particular moment in a computation. A visible configuration consists of that part of a configuration which is visible to P , that is, all but what is private to V. We define a visible history as a sequence of visible configurations which P could have observed up to a particular moment in a computation. Thus, P's strategy depends only on what has been visible to it, namely, a visible history. We say that P has a move in visible history h if the last visible configuration in the sequence h is one in which it is P's turn to move.
Unless otherwise stated we always assume that our interactive proof system runs in polynomial time as a function of the input length. Both the Prover and the Verifier are limited to polynomial time and the number of alternations is limited to polynomial time. As such, any strategy of P can be represented as an exponential size object U , which lists for every potential visible history in which P must move, exactly what nondeterministic choice P should make next. That is, U is a list of pairs of the form ( h , m) where h is a visible history and m is a move of P. Given a strategy U , a computation tree T ( u ) can be constructed which records all the possible moves of V and the particular choices that P would make in reaction to these moves. Thus, the nodes of T ( u ) are labeled with configurations. Because V can move privately, P's choices must be identical for branches of T(u) with the same visible history. Given an input 2 and strategy U , let (P, V, x, U ) be the probabilistic Turing machine which consists of P executing using the strategy U and V running randomly on input x. We say that (P,V) accepts the language L if:
We define IP to be the class of languages which are accepted by interactive proof systems. In the following we will be presenting a number of restrictions of interactive proof systems. The class of languages accepted by interactive proof systems with k of these restrictions is denoted by IP(<restriction 1>, <restriction 2>,. . . , <restriction k>).
Public Interactive Proof Systems
If the Verifier's random coin and work tapes are visible to the Prover then the interactive proof system (P, V ) is said to be public. IP(pub1ic) is the class of languages accepted by public interactive proof systems. When the interactive proof system is public then a strategy of P is, a slightly simpler object, although still potentially exponential in size. In particular, P's strategy can be assumed to be Markov, that is, the strategy need only depend on the current configuration of the interactive proof system, not on the entire visible history. Goldwasser and Sipser have shown that IP = IP(pub1ic) [13] . However, as we pointed out earlier, when other restrictions are included this equivalence may break down. We can state unequivocally that IP(public, <restriction 1>, ..., <restriction k>) is always a subset of IP(<restriction 1>, ..., <restriction k>).
Polynomial Size Strategy
Intuitively, if there is a polynomial p such that for any t E L, the Prover's strategy can be expressed as a string T with 1 7 1 5 p(ltI), then we say that ( P , V ) is poly-strategy. We can imagine that T is written on an "advice tape" provided to P. Given a visible history and the advice T, P can calculate in deterministic polynomial time what move it should make from the visible history to continue its strategy. More formally, we say that a polynomial time computable function f is a strategy evaluator if whenever f is provided a string T and a visible history h, produces f (~, h ) , a. move for P from the visible history h. Given a strategy evaluator f and a string 7, define a(f, T) to be the strategy in which P always makes the move f (~, h ) in response to the visible history h. We say that L E IP(po1y-strategy) if there is an interactive proof system (P, V ) , strategy evaluator f , and polynomial p with the properties:
Please note that if 3: L then we maintain the strong requirement that the Verifier accepts with probability 5 even if the Prover has an arbitrary strategy. On the other hand, if t E L then the Prover only needs a polynomial amount of information produce a strategy for which the Verifier will accept with probability 2 $.
The most common case of a polynomial size strategy is when the number of visible histories in which P must move is bounded by a polynomial. In this case T is just a strategy of P and the strategy evaluator, f , applied to the argument (7, h) simply looks up a pair ( h , m) in the list T and returns m. Thus, a( f, T) = T.
Polynomial Tree Size
As noted earlier, given a strategy a there is an associated computation tree T(o). This computation tree represents the entire computation by the Prover following strategy U and the Verifier. In order to assess the Prover's view of the computation tree we coalesce nodes in the tree which represent the same visible hi5 tory. The result is the computation tree as viewed by the Prover, which we call the visible computation tree, PT(a). is the visible configuration common to all the nodes in the equivalence class of nodes of T(u) which make up that node. We call the restriction when the visible computation tree PT(a) has polynomial size, the poly-tree-site restriction.
We say L E IP(po1y-tree-size) if there is a polynomial p such that:
1. If t E L then for some a, IPT(a)l 5 p(lt1) and
Even though PT(a) is of polynomial size, the computation tree T(a) may still be of exponential size.
However, from P's point of view the computation tree appears to have polynomial size, since it only views a polynomial number of potential visible histories by following its strategy. In the case that (P, V) is a public interactive proof system, PT(a) = T(u). Given a visible computation tree as the representation of a strategy, it is easy to calculate a Prover's move from the tree. Thus, we immediately have (i) IP(po1y-tree-size) E IP(po1y-strategy) ,
(ii) IP(public, poly-tree-size) C IP(public, polystrategy).
Logarithmic Random Bits
One way to guarantee polynomial tree size is to is to insist that the Verifier may only use O(1og n) random bits in any run, where n is the length of the input. We call this restriction log-random-bits. In this case, any computation tree T(u) has polynomial size regardless of whether (P, V) is public or not. Thus any strategy of P need only list reactions to a polynomial number of potential visible histories. Define IP(1og-random-bits) to be the class of languages accepted by interactive proof systems where V uses only logn random bits in any run on an input 2 where n = 121. We have immediately:
IP(po1y-tree-size) IP(po1y-strategy),
(ii) IP(public, log-random-bits) C IP(public, polytree-size) C IP(public, poly-strategy).
Logarithmic Space
One final restriction is to place a limit on the space which the Prover and Verifier may use in their computations. In this case we also place a limit on the size of the communication tape so that it cannot be used to supplant the work tapes of the Prover and Verifier.
We say that the interactive proof system (P, V ) is logspace restricted if for any input of length n both P and V use O(1ogn) work tape space and 0(1) communication tape space. A language L is a member of IP(1og-space) if there is a log space bounded interactive proof system which accepts L. We may easily combine the log-space restriction with any of the restrictions public, log-random-bits, and poly-tree-size. We immediately have the following:
(i) IP(1og-space, log-random-bits) IP(1og-space, poly-tree-size),
(ii) IP(public, log-space, log-random-bits) C IP(public, log-space, poly-tree-size).
Note that we do not try to combine log-space with poly-strategy because the definition of poly-strategy may be sensitive to the representation of the strategy on the "advice tape" when we only allow limited space by the Prover.
Amplification
All the restrictions mentioned in this section are robust with respect to "constant amplification". That is, given an interactive proof system which includes any of the restrictions (poly-strategy, polynomial-tree-size, log-random-bits, log-space, public) a new interactive proof system can be constructed satisfying the same restrictions by repeating the original interactive proof a constant number of times with the acceptance condition being that the majority of the trials are accepting. Thus, if in the original interactive proof system the probability of acceptance for inputs in the language is at least (Y > ! j and the probability of acceptance for inputs not in the language at most 1 -a, then for any , B < 1 there is an amplified interactive proof with acceptance probability at least ,B for inputs in the language and acceptance probability at most 1 -p for inputs not in ithe language. The values a and / 3 are independent of the actual input and are parameters of the interactive proof systems solely. The restrictions of polynomial size strategy, logarithmic space, and public Verifier are also robust with respect to "polynomial amplification". However, amplification by more than a constant for either polynomial tree size or logarithmic random bits interactive proof systems will lead to interactive proofs which do not satisfy the same restriction.
Unrestricted Space
In this section we consider interactive proof systems in which the Prover and Verifier may use unlimited space. By definition both are restricted to polynomial time, so that unrestricted space essentially amounts to polynomial space. By a series of straightforward observations, we classify all of the interactive proof systems, both public and private, with the restrictions poly-strategy, poly-tree-size, and log-random-bits.
In the next two theorems, we show that three of the resulting complexity classes are equal to MA and three are equal to NP. The class MA was introduced by Babai and Moran [l] . In our notation, the class MA consists of those languages accepted by public interactive proof systems (P, V), where every possible run of the system is restricted so that first P computes, then V computes, and the system halts. Thus, P never computes further once V starts its computation. Note that NP is equivalent to the class of languages acc$pted by interactive proof systems where the Verifier is deterministic, that is, an interactive proof system dith nondeterministic, but no random, moves. Hence, IdP is clearly contained in MA, and it is not known if this containment is proper.
Theorem 1 MA = IP(po1y-tree-size) = IP(public, poly-strategy) = IP(po1y-strategy).
Proof: We first show that MA C IP(public, polystrategy). Suppose L E MA. Let (P, V ) be the public interactive proof system accepting L , where P coinputes and then V computes and halts.
Suppose input x E L , and suppose that on strategy A similar proof shows that MA C IP(po1y-treesize).
We saw in Sections 2.1 and 2.3 that IP(public, polystrategy) IP(po1y-strategy) and IP(po1y-tree-size) E: IP(po1y-strategy). Hence, to complete the proof, we show that IP(po1y-strategy) C MA.
Let L be a language in IP(po1y-strategy) and let interactive proof system (P, V) accept L , where (P, V ) , together with strategy evaluator f and polynomial p , satisfy the properties of Section 2.2. We show that L E MA, by constructing a new public interactive proof system (P',V') for L. On input x, P' writes on the communication tape a string T of length at most ~( 1~1 ) . Once this is done, P' never moves further. Then V' simulates the computation of (PI V ) on the strategy a ( f ,~) .
To do this, whenever it is P's turn and the visible history so far is h, V' computes f (~, h ) . Since f is polynomial time computable, V'
can simulate a move of P in deterministic polynomial time. Moreover, all of VI'S moves are visible to P'.
If the input x E L , then there is a r of polynomial length, such that Pr[(P, V, x, a(f, T ) ) accepts] 2 $.
Hence P' can guess this string r to ensure that x is accepted by (P', V'). If x # L, then no guess of P'
will cause V' to accept with probability greater than 5. Also, note that the strategy guessed by P' cannot depend on VI'S moves, even though they are visible to P', because P' never moves once V' has made a move. Hence, L E MA. 0
Theorem 2 NP = IP(public, poly-tree-size) = IP(public, log-random-bits) = IP(1og-random-bits).
Proof: Trivially, NP 2 IP(public, log-randombits), since NP can be modeled as an interactive proof where the Verifier is deterministic. We have already noted that IP(public, log-random-bits) E IP(public, poly-tree-size) and that IP(public, log-random-bits) 2
IP(1og-random-bits). To demonstrate that IP(public, poly-tree-size) NP, let L be accepted by a public, poly-tree-size interactive proof system (P, V ) where p is the polynomial which bounds the tree size. The NP algorithm to accept L on input z, is to guess a computation tree T(u) of size 5 p(Ixl), then evaluate it. By evaluate the tree we mean assign a value to each node in the tree which represents the probability of acceptance if P follows the strategy a starting at the configuration which labels the node. Thus, the value of the root is simply Pr[(P, V, x, a) accepts]. If the value of the root is at least 2/3 then the NP algorithm accepts 2. The evaluation of the computation tree T ( a ) is done bottom up, with accept leaves evaluated to 1 and the reject leaves evaluated 0. A node which represents a, random move of the Verifier is evaluated as the average of the values of its two children. All other nodes are simply given the value of its sole child.
To complete the proof, it is straightforward to show that IP(1og-random-bits) C NP. 0
Private, Logarithmic Space
In this section, we consider log-space bounded interactive proof systems with the restrictions poly-tree-size or log-random-bits. The main results of this section is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 NP = IP(1og-space, log-random-bits) =

IP(log-space, poly-tree-size).
To prove this, we first show in Lemma 1 that IP(1og-space, poly-tree-size) C NP. In Lemma 2, we show that NP IP(1og-space, log-random-bits). The theorem follows immediately from these two lemmas and observation (i) of Section 2.5. All of the proofs in this section are valid even without the assumption that the interactive proof system runs in polynomial time, as long as it halts with probability 1 on any strategy of the Prover.
Lemma 1 IP(1og-space, poly-tree-size) g NP Proof: Let L be in IP(1og-space, poly-tree-size) and let (P, V ) be the restricted interactive proof system accepting L. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm that accepts L.
To decide if an input x is in L, this algorithm guesses a strategy of the Prover and computes the probability that the Verifier accepts, when the Prover uses that strategy. If x E L , the Prover has a strategy U which can be represented by a visible computation tree, PT(u), of size polynomial in 1x1. This tree can be guessed in polynomial time. The main part of the proof is to show how to compute the probability that the Verifier accepts, when the Prover uses strategy U .
Let m be the number of configurations of (P, V ) on input x, and assume that the configurations are numbered from 1 to m. Note that m = poly(n), since the computation is O(1og n) space bounded. For convenience, assume that the initial configuration is numbered 1 and that there is a unique accepting configuration, which is numbered m.
With each node N of the tree PT(u), we associate a probability vector ti = (u(l), . . 
. , u(m)). Entry u ( j )
is defined to be the probability that configuration j is reached given that the computation of (P, V, 2, c) follows the path from the root to the node N in P T ( u ) .
Thus, u ( j ) = 0 unless the visible part of j is identical to the visible configuration which labels node N . Clearly, the vector associated with the root is   (1, 0, . . . , 0 ) , since we are assuming that the initial configuration is numbered 1. If N is a leaf, then entry u(m) is the probability that V accepts, given that the visible part of the computation is the sequence of visible configurations which labels the path from the root of PT(u) to N . Hence, the probability that V accepts, given that the Prover uses strategy U , is the sum, over the leaves of PT(a), of u(m).
We claim that the vectors can be computed in polynomial time; hence the probability that V accepts can ( 1 )~. . . , u'(m) ). Then ii' is the vector associated with node NI.
To complete the proof that all vectors can be computed in polynomial time, it must be shown that the matrix M can be computed in polynomial time, and its entries are rational numbers of polynomial length. The proof is similar to a proof of Gill ([lo], Theorem 6.4) for probabilistic Turing machines. 0
In previous work, Condon [3] showed that NP IP(1og-space), even when the Verifier runs in polynomial time. However, the Verifier could use polynomially many random bits. In the next lemma, we show how the number of bits is reduced to O(1og n).
Lemma 2 NP C IP(log-space, log-random-bits).
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 was actually begun in the introduction, Section 1.1, where we explained why 3-CNF-SAT is in IP(1og-space, log-random-bits). We next complete the proof that 3-CNF-SAT is in IP(1og-space, log-random-bits). Once this is established, we can conclude that NP C IP(1og-space, lograndom-bits) because IP(1og-space, log-random-bits) is closed under log-space reductions and 3-CNF-SAT is NP-complete for log-space reductions.
Let f be an instance of the 3-CNF-SAT problem. We showed in Section 1.1 that to test whether f is satisfiable, the Verifier must test the equality of two multi-sets, which have size linear in the size of the formula, f . The first and second multisets consist of the triples ( I , i, w) , sent by the Prover to the Verifier in the first and second stages, respectively, of the interactive proof system for 3-CNF-SAT described in Section 1.1, on input f . Lipton showed how to test for equality of two multisets using very few random bits. This is done by comparing a fingerprint of each multiset. A fingerprint of a multiset (~1~~2 , . . . , zk} is defined to be nf=l(zi + r ) modp, where p is a prime and r E (1,. . . , p -1). Lipton proved the following:
Public, Logarithmic Space
In this section we consider public interactive proof systems in which the Verifier is restricted to log-space.
nondeterministic O(1og n)-space bounded Turing machine and let LOGCFL be the class of languages which are O(1og n)-space reducible to context-free languages [MI. We have the following relationships. It is straightforward to show that p and r can be chosen using O(1ogn) random bits with high probability, say > 3/4.
Lemma
Clearly, if the formula is satisfiable there is a strategy for the Prover which leads to acceptance with probability one. If the formula is not satisfiable then the interactive proof system accepts with probability at most 1/3. One source of error is due to the fact that the Verifier may incorrectly accept a formula which is not satisfiable, if the random numbers p and r are not successfully chosen. We have just shown that this happens with probability at most 1/4. The other source of error is due to the fact that even if two multisets are not equal, they may get the same fingerprint. The Fingerprinting Lemma guarantees that this happens with probability at most O ( l / n ) , where n is the size of the formula. Hence, the protocol erroneously accepts with probability at most 1/3.
This completes the proof that 3-CNF-SAT E IP(1og-space, log-random-bits). Hence, NP C IP(1og-space, log-random-bits). 0 Theorem 4 NLOG C IP(public, log-space, polytree-sire) = IP(public, log-space, log-random-bits) E
LOGCFL.
Proof: The inclusion NLOG IP(public, logspace, poly-tree-size) follows because NLOG can be modeled as a log-space interactive proof system with a deterministic Verifier. We have already noted the inclusion IP (public, log-space , log-random-bits) C_ IP(public, log-space, poly-tree-size). To complete the proof we need to show IP(public, log-space, lograndom-bits) 2 LOGCFL (Lemma 3) and IP(public, log-space, poly-tree-size) C IP(public, log-space, lograndom-bits) (Lemma 4).
Lemma 3 IP(public, log-space, log-random-bits) E
Proof: To argue that IP(public, log-space, lograndom-bits) E LOGCFL we use the equivalence of LOGCFL and the class of languages accepted by nondeterministic pushdown automata which have O(1og n) auxiliary storage and run in polynomial time [18] . Suppose L E IP(public, log-spacel log-randombits) and let 2 be an input to a public, log-space, lograndom-bits, interactive proof system (P, V ) which accepts L. We will construct an auxiliary PDA M which accepts L. Generally speaking, A4 evaluates a computation tree T ( a ) for some a. The nondeterministic moves of the PDA can simulate the strategy U of the Prover. The pushdown store of the PDA is used to search and store partial evaluations of T(u). The PDA runs in polynomial time because the tree it has to search is of polynomial size. The PDA only uses log-space because the probabilities it has to calculate can be represented in O(1ogn) bits.
To evaluate T(u) for some 6 , M starts with the unevaluated initial configuration of (P, V ) (except for the input) in its storage and an empty pushdown store.
In a general situation M has a configuration (evaluated or unevaluated) in its storage and the sequence of configurations (partially evaluated or unevaluated) leading to that configuration on its pushdown store. At termination the evaluated initial configuration will be in its storage and the pushdown store will be empty again. If the value of the evaluated initial configura- If the configuration C in the storage is unevaluated then if C is accepting configuration then give it the value 1, if C is a rejecting configuration then give it the value 0, if C is a configuration in which it is P's turn to move then nondeterministically choose a successor configuration to replace C in the storage and push C onto the pushdown store, if C is a configuration in which it is V's turn to move randomly then choose the successor configuration which corresponds to the random choice 0 to replace C in the storage a.nd push C onto the pushdown store, if C is a configuration in which it is V's turn to move deterministically then choose the successor configuration to replace C in the storage and push C onto the pushdown store. The proof that M accepts L is tedious, requiring the proof of an invariant which describes the relationship between the evaluation of a computation tree T(u) and the computation of M . Roughly speaking the invariant states that the pushdown store of M contains the labels of a root to node path in T(u) for some U and the contents of the storage the label of a successor of the last node in the path. If a configuration in the pushdown store which corresponds to a node N in T ( a ) has a partial value then the configuration is random and the partial value is the value of the subtree of T ( a ) rooted the successor of N which corresponds to the random choice 0. If the configuration in the storage has a value then it is the value of the subtree of T ( u ) rooted at the node labeled with that configuration. The statement of the complete invariant and its proof is left to the reader. Thus, M accepts the language L.
It is straightforward to show that M uses log n auxiliary storage and polynomial time. 0 Lemma 4 IP(public, log-space, poly-tree-size) C IP(public, log-space, log-random-bits).
Proof:
The basic idea is to use tree pruning to reduce the amount of the randomness while reducing the probability of acceptance only slightly. Let T be a binary branching tree with N > 0 nodes. In a binary branching tree every internal node has exactly two children. Define Ti to be T pruned to nodes of height i or less. Thus, To has one node, namely, the root of T , TI contains the root of T and its two children if it has children, and T, = T for all m 2 the height of T . Define w ( i ) to be the probability that a leaf of T is reached in traversing a root-to-leaf path in Ti assuming that each of the two children of an internal node are chosen with equal probability. In traversing a. root-to-leaf path in either the leaf reached is also a leaf of T because the length of the path is < i, or the leaf reached is an internal node of T. In the former case the traversal is a success and in the latter a failure.
Tree Pruning Lemma. For all k 2 1, w(rlogN1 + k -1 ) > 1 -2 -k .
Given the tree pruning lemma we can argue that O(1ogn) random bits are sufficient. Let L be accepted by an interactive proof system (P, V ) which is public, log-space, and poly-tree-size. We construct (P', V') which is a simple modification of (P, V ) . Let z be an input of length n and let N = poly(n) be a bound on the tree size. The new interactive proof system (P', V') will simulate move-for-move ( P , V ) except if V' makes more than pogN1 + 2 random moves then V' immediately halts and rejects t. By the tree pruning lemma, choosing k = 3 , if U is any strategy for P, then U is also a strategy for P' with the property that 
Conclusion
We have identified what we feel captures the notion of a practical interactive proof system, namely, an interactive proof system in which the Prover can only rely on a polynomial size strategy. We explored several additional restrictions such as polynomial tree size, logarithmic random bits, and logarithmic space. For the most part we were able to classify fully what the effects of these restrictions are.
One important problem left is to identify problems which have the full power of IP(po1y-strategy) which is identical to Babai and Moran's class MA [l] . Such problems could serve as a stronger cornerstone for cryptography than problems that are currently used such as factoring, quadratic residuosity, and discrete logarithms which in some sense are all "NP-like" problems.
Another intriguing problem is to classify IP(public, log-space, log-random-bits) more fully. Could this class be equal to LOGCFL? Fortnow and Lund have shown that NC is contained IP(public, log-space), but their simulations use logo(') n coin flips [9] . When their simulation is adapted to LOGCFL, which is contained in NC2 [16] , then the number of coin flips is O(log2n). Reducing the number of coin flips to O(1ogn) appears to require a new technique.
Finally, there is the question of how this theory of restricted interactive proofs systems could be brought into the theory of zero-knowledge interactive proof systems. It is our impression that many researchers working in zero-knowledge, which is closely related to cryptography, are already somewhat practically motivated. Thus, they are, for the most part, already implicitly using restricted interactive proof systems. Figure 1 . There are three dimensions in the restrictions with each dimension ranging from least restrictive to most restrictive: (i) poly-strategy -polytree-size -log-random-bits, (ii) private -public, and (iii) unrestricted space -log-space. The figure describes the relationships between the restricted interactive proof systems with the top-to-bottom direction indicating less restrictive to more restrictive. Equivalent classes are encircled.
